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Juveniles in Kansas Have a Constitutional Right 
to a Jury Trial.  Now What?  Making Sense of In 
re L.M.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For many years, juveniles across the country have been accused of 
serious crimes and sentenced to years in jail without the right to a jury 
trial.  Recently, however, that changed for juveniles in Kansas.  It began 
with a sixteen-year-old being arrested on one count of aggravated sexual 
battery and one count of minor in possession of alcohol.1  In district 
court, the juvenile—known only as L.M.—requested a jury trial, but the 
judge denied the request,2 exercising the court’s right under the Kansas 
Juvenile Justice Code (KJJC).3  After a bench trial, L.M. was convicted 
on both counts and sentenced to eighteen months in a juvenile 
correctional facility.4  However, L.M.’s sentence was stayed, he was 
placed on probation until the age of twenty, and he was required to 
register as a sex offender.5  L.M. appealed the denial of a jury trial to the 
Kansas Supreme Court, which issued a landmark decision in June 2008.  
The court ruled that juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial, 
both under the Kansas Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, via the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.6  The decision sent shockwaves 
through the Kansas juvenile justice system and left county officials, 
judges, attorneys, and legislators scrambling to determine the effect of 
the opinion.7 
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 1. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 165 (Kan. 2008). 
 2. Id. 
 3. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2357 (Supp. 2008). 
 4. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 165. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 170, 172. 
 7. See David Klepper & Diane Carroll, Ruling Causes Seismic Shift in State’s Court, KAN. 
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The U.S. Constitution recognizes that a defendant’s right to a jury is 
fundamental to a fair trial.8  Historically, however, the right has not been 
secured for juveniles, even as it has come to be regarded as essential to 
due process in adult proceedings.9  Recently though, juveniles around the 
country have gained traction in the battle to safeguard their right, and the 
In re L.M. decision is a significant step down that path.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court in In re L.M., however, gave little insight to lower courts 
on how a juvenile’s right to a jury trial should operate.10  This Note will 
analyze the court’s opinion, critique several potential standards, and 
determine a logical solution that balances the nature and goals of the 
juvenile justice system with inherent policy concerns. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The right to a jury trial has a long and storied history in both English 
common law and the American legal tradition.11  Interestingly, the right 
was extended to juveniles at common law, but that tradition did not find 
its way to the New World.12  Instead, a new and entirely separate juvenile 
justice system was constructed at the end of the nineteenth century.13  
That system emerged out of the progressive reform movement of the 
time.14  Beginning in the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court began 
to recognize the necessity of due process rights to this separate judicial 
system.15  But progress has been neither fast nor thorough.  Such 
incremental progress has put the right to a jury trial and the juvenile 
justice system on a collision course for the last quarter century.  Now that 
they have collided, it must be determined whether the benefits of the 
separate system of juvenile justice and the exercise of the right to a jury 
trial can both be salvaged. 
                                                                                                                       
CITY STAR, June 21, 2008, at A4; David Klepper, Major Changes Predicted in Juvenile Justice 
System, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 28, 2008, at B1; Randall Hodgkinson, Juveniles Have Right to a 
Jury Trial, KAN. DEFENDERS, June 20, 2008, http://kansasdefenders.blogspot.com/2008/06/ 
juveniles-have-right-to-jury-trial.html; Ron Sylvester, Court Hustles to Prepare for Upcoming 
Juvenile Jury Trials, WHAT THE JUDGE ATE FOR BREAKFAST: NEWS FROM INSIDE WICHITA’S 
COURTS, June 24, 2008, http://blogs.kansas.com/courts/2008/06/24/court-hustles-to-prepare-for-
upcoming-juvenile-jury-trials. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 9. Gerald P. Hill, II, Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury Trials in Juvenile 
Proceedings Under the Sixth Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143, 143 (2008). 
 10. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 172. 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 396–409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 13. See infra notes 35–36. 
 14. See infra notes 28–34. 
 15. See infra notes 48–60. 
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A. A Brief History of the Right to a Jury Trial 
To understand the integral part that the jury trial plays in American 
criminal justice, one must first understand the origin and history of the 
right.  Justice Hugo Black captured the right’s importance when he stated 
succinctly that it “is . . . one of the fundamental aspects of criminal 
justice in the English-speaking world.”16  The majority in Duncan v. 
Louisiana—the seminal case on an adult’s right to a jury trial—
established that the right is “fundamental to the American scheme of 
justice.”17  However, as Justice Black intimated, the history of the right 
does not begin in the New World.  The right played a fundamental part 
within English common law, long before the formation of the United 
States of America and the adoption of the Bill of Rights.18  This history 
helps explain the right’s status as crucial to maintaining a civilized 
society.19  Indeed, scholars and judges argue that the history of the right 
dates back to the Magna Carta in 1215.20  Under English common law, 
the rule was that “the truth of every accusation . . . should afterwards be 
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant’s] 
equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all 
suspicion.”21 
When British colonists arrived in the New World, they wasted little 
time incorporating the right to a jury trial in the new criminal justice 
system.  On October 19, 1765, the Stamp Act Congress recognized the 
right to a jury trial for all British subjects.22  The First Continental 
Congress and Declaration of Independence then followed suit.23  In both 
instances, the colonists pointedly noted an affinity for trial by jury and 
reinforced an innate distrust of judges that relied on the British Crown 
for their salaries.24  The right to a jury trial was formally adopted in 
American law when the U.S. Constitution was ratified.25  In response to 
growing concerns that the right was not properly safeguarded, it was then 
                                                          
 16. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 34 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 17. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 18. Id. at 151–52. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (Cooley 
ed., 1899)); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 563 (1971) (plurality opinion) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 21. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 361. 
 22. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151–52 (citing SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 270 (R. Perry ed., 1959)). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. at 152. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
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included in the Bill of Rights via the Sixth Amendment, which reads: “In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed.”26  Additionally, every original state, 
and every state thereafter, adopted the right to a jury trial within their 
respective constitutions.27 
B. The Establishment and Evolution of a Separate Justice System for 
Juveniles 
1. Shifting Paradigms and the Origins of a Separate System 
In order to understand the role of the jury trial, or lack thereof, in the 
juvenile justice system, it is first important to understand the history, 
character, and operation of the system.  The idea for a separate justice 
system arose out of the progressive movement toward the end of the 
nineteenth century.28  In their efforts to reform juvenile justice, the 
progressives were responding to a variety of changes within society, 
including rapid industrialization and urbanization, as well as “changes in 
family structure, the function of the family in society, and a new cultural 
perception of childhood.”29  Children began to be seen as “vulnerable, 
innocent, passive, and dependent beings who needed extended 
preparation for life.”30  This was a radical departure from the general 
conception of children as little adults, which had been the foundation for 
juvenile justice for three centuries.31  The changing beliefs in the nature 
of childhood and the family coincided with a similar changing belief as 
to the sources of juvenile criminal behavior.32  Theorists began to argue 
that juvenile crime was caused by external factors, not by free-willed 
actors.33  These changes in society and in criminal philosophy 
precipitated a diminishing belief in the moral responsibility of children  
 
                                                          
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 27. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 153. 
 28. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, 
and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 823 (1988). 
 29. Id. at 822. 
 30. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 694 
(1991). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Feld, supra note 28, at 824. 
 33. See Feld, supra note 30, at 694 (“Although classical criminal law attributed crime to free-
willed actors, positivist criminology regarded crime as determined rather than chosen.”). 
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and an effort to shift the focus of the juvenile justice system from 
punishment to rehabilitation and protection.34 
In this vein, the first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 
1899.35  This new juvenile court adopted the doctrine of parens patriae.36  
With the doctrine, juvenile adjudications became guided by the “child’s 
‘best interests,’ background, and welfare.”37  As a result, the “sentences 
were indeterminate [and] nonproportional.”38  Furthermore, the new 
system provided the court with “considerable latitude” to adjudicate 
juveniles.39  The system’s focus was on achieving high-minded goals, 
such as protecting and rehabilitating the juvenile, and maintaining the 
family—not on consistency in sentencing and punishment.40 
To achieve such goals, the juvenile justice courts took a number of 
precautions aimed at protecting juveniles.  These steps included making 
“hearings . . . confidential, access to court records limited, and [finding] 
children . . . delinquent rather than guilty of committing a crime.”41  But 
not only did the look and feel of the system become more intimate, the 
adjudication process changed drastically.  The “judges, assisted by social 
workers, [were] to investigate the problematic child’s background, 
identify the sources of the misconduct at issue, and develop a treatment 
plan to meet the child’s needs.”42  Judges began relying on psychologists 
and social workers, trying to gather as much information on the character 
and lifestyle of the child as possible.43  Consequently, the actual offense 
committed became less significant.44  The system as a whole was built to 
revolve around the best interest of the child.45  But over time, it became 
clear the new system did not substantially lower recidivism rates.46  That 
reality, coupled with a recognition that the difference between juvenile 
incarceration and adult incarceration was minimal, led the United States 
                                                          
 34. Id. 
 35. Sandra M. Ko, Comment, Why Do They Continue to Get the Worst of Both Worlds? The 
Case for Providing Louisiana’s Juveniles with the Right to a Jury in Delinquency Adjudications, 12 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 161, 164 (2004). 
 36. Id. at 164–65. 
 37. Feld, supra note 30, at 695. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Ko, supra note 35, at 165. 
 40. Feld, supra note 28, at 824. 
 41. Id. at 825. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Ko, supra note 35, at 166 (“Juvenile institutions were no more rehabilitative than adult 
prisons.”). 
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Supreme Court to begin extending constitutional due process protections 
to juvenile adjudications.47 
2. The Extension of Due Process Rights to Juveniles 
The Supreme Court’s process of extending due process rights to 
juveniles began in the 1960s.  The first case was In re Gault, in which 
the Supreme Court asserted that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor 
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”48  The Court adopted a narrow 
approach, limiting consideration to the adjudication process and not 
touching on intake or post-adjudication.49  Gault began by examining the 
dubious historical relevance of the parens patriae doctrine.50  The Court 
briefly discussed the dramatic difference between the new system and 
common law juvenile adjudications.51  At common law, anyone over the 
age of seven was “subjected to arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment 
like adult offenders.”52  The Court then turned to the fiction created by 
the progressive reformers—that juveniles could only be entitled to 
custody, rather than liberty—which made the juvenile proceedings civil 
in nature and not subject to constitutional safeguards.53  The Court found 
the separate juvenile system did not always reach the highest ideals: 
“The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has 
not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures.  Departures 
from established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in 
enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.”54  Furthermore, in Kent v. 
United States, the Court asserted that “there may be grounds for concern 
that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the 
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative 
treatment postulated for children.”55 
The Court found the lack of due process had resulted in “unfairness 
to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and 
                                                          
 47. Id. 
 48. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 16. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 17 (“If [a child’s] parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions—
that is, if the child is ‘delinquent’—the state may intervene.  In doing so, it does not deprive the child 
of any rights, because he has none.  It merely provides the ‘custody’ to which the child is entitled.”). 
 54. Id. at 18–19. 
 55. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
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unfortunate prescriptions of remedy.”56  Furthermore, the rehabilitative 
focus of the juvenile court system had not substantially reduced 
recidivism rates,57 which led the Gault Court to hold that juveniles were 
entitled to limited due process protections—including the right to notice 
of charges, appointment of counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and 
silence in the face of interrogation.58  Then, in 1970, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the reasonable doubt standard also applied to juveniles, stating 
that “[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in 
factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent 
child.”59  Additionally, the Court ruled in Breed v. Jones that juveniles 
should be protected against the threat of double jeopardy.60 
The aforementioned cases laid the foundation upon which the Court 
considered McKeiver v. Pennsylvania in 1970–71.61  The McKeiver 
Court declined to recognize a juvenile’s constitutional right to a jury trial 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.62  McKeiver turned on the 
issue of whether juvenile adjudications are criminal prosecutions within 
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.63  Specifically, the Court looked at 
whether a jury is a necessary component to accurate fact finding in 
juvenile adjudications.64  The plurality briefly discussed the downfalls of 
the juvenile justice system, noting that “[t]oo often the juvenile court 
judge falls far short of that stalwart, protective, and communicating 
figure the system envisaged.”65 
However, even in acknowledging numerous faults in the system, the 
Court did not recognize a juvenile’s constitutional right to a jury trial.66  
The Court cited several reasons for its decision, including: (1) a concern 
that the juvenile justice system would become completely adversarial; 
(2) that juries would not sufficiently enhance the court’s fact finding 
function; and (3) a belief the juvenile justice system was still effective.67  
Though the Court made efficiency arguments, the primary focus of the 
opinion was on how recognizing the right to a jury trial would inalterably 
                                                          
 56. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 19–20. 
 57. Id. at 22. 
 58. Id. at 33, 41, 55, 57. 
 59. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970). 
 60. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975). 
 61. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
 62. Id. at 545. 
 63. Id. at 540–41. 
 64. Id. at 543. 
 65. Id. at 544. 
 66. Id. at 545. 
 67. Id. at 545–47. 
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change the nature of the juvenile adjudication process, effectively 
destroying its intimate and private nature.68  In contrast, Justice Douglas, 
who wrote the dissent in McKeiver, focused on the potential term of 
incarceration.69  Justice Douglas argued that it is inappropriate to 
incarcerate individuals for substantial periods without providing them 
with all of the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.70 
After McKeiver, the Kansas Supreme Court considered a juvenile’s 
right to a jury trial in Findlay v. State, holding that juveniles did not have 
the right under the Kansas Constitution.71  The court adopted 
substantially the same reasoning as the United States Supreme Court, 
quoting McKeiver at length.72  However, the Kansas Supreme Court did 
not rely solely on McKeiver; the court also examined the intent expressed 
in the Kansas Juvenile Offender Code (KJOC), the precursor to the 
KJJC: 
In no case shall any order, judgment or decree of the district court, in 
any proceedings under the provisions of this code, be deemed or held to 
import a criminal act on the part of any juvenile; but all proceedings, 
orders, judgments and decrees shall be deemed to have been taken and 
done in the exercise of the parental power of the state.73 
The court noted that the statute did not impart criminal acts to juveniles, 
so juvenile adjudications were not equivalent to criminal prosecutions 
under section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights,74 which 
guarantees jury trials for criminal prosecutions.75  Because juveniles 
could not be subject to criminal prosecutions, they were not entitled to 
exercise the right to a jury trial under the Kansas Constitution.76 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 545. 
 69. Id. at 560 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Findlay v. State, 681 P.2d 20, 22 (Kan. 1984), abrogated by In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 
2008). 
 72. Id. at 21–22. 
 73. Id. at 22 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1601 (repealed 2006)). 
 74. See id. (stating that the argument that “proceedings involving acts by juveniles that would 
constitute felonies if committed by adults are essentially criminal trials” is in “diametric conflict” 
with the KJOC). 
 75. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 5. 
 76. Findlay, 681 P.2d at 22. 
07.0_TREASTER FINAL 4/22/2009  8:05:31 AM 
2009] JUVENILES IN KANSAS 1283 
C. Operation and Character of the Kansas Juvenile Justice System 
1. Intake and Assessment 
It has been nearly twenty-five years since the Findlay decision, and 
though the Kansas juvenile justice system has changed dramatically, it 
has retained several notable features.  First, juveniles encounter a 
comprehensive intake process, which is a more personalized evaluation 
than the standard booking process used for adults.77  Once a juvenile is 
arrested and a complaint is filed, that juvenile is turned over to a Juvenile 
Intake and Assessment Center (JIAC), which administers the Juvenile 
Intake and Assessment Questionnaire (JIAQ), does other assessment 
screening, and engages in the referral and placement of children.78 
The interview process works to both evaluate the juvenile and 
involve the parent or legal guardian.  The phases proceed as follows: (1) 
an interview is conducted using the JIAQ and an additional problem-
oriented screening instrument, which is voluntary for the juvenile; (2) the 
juvenile’s parent, legal guardian, or other adult is contacted; (3) an 
attempt is made to review the results of the interview with the 
appropriate adult—but if not making this attempt is in the best interest of 
the child, the review is not required.79  Once the interview is completed, 
the worker makes one of the following referrals: 
 
(A) Release the child to the custody of the . . . legal guardian or another 
appropriate adult if the . . . worker believes that it would be in the 
best interest of the child and it would not be harmful to the child to 
do so. 
 
(B) Conditionally release the child . . . if the intake assessment worker 
believes that if the conditions are met, it would be in the child’s best 
interest to release the child . . . and the intake and assessment worker 
has reason to believe that it might be harmful to the child to release 
the child . . . without imposing the conditions.  The conditions may 
include, but are not limited to: 
 
 ● Participation of the child in counseling 
 ● Participation of members of the child’s family in counseling 
 
                                                          
 77. National Center for Juvenile Justice, State Juvenile Justice Profiles: Kansas, http:// 
www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/profiles/KS06.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 
 78. KANSAS JUVENILE JUSTICE AUTHORITY, STANDARDS AND RULES 15 (2002), available at 
http://www.kansas.gov/jja/documents/JIAS_StandardsandRules_1.pdf. 
 79. Id. at 16–18. 
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 ● Participation by the child, members of the child’s family and 
other relevant person[s] in mediation 
 ● Referral of the child and the child’s family to the Secretary of 
Social and Rehabilitation Services for services and the agreement 
of the child and family to accept and participate in the services 
offered 
 ● Referral of the child and the child’s family to available 
community resources or services and the agreement of the child 
and family to accept and participate in the services offered 
 ● Requiring the child and members of the child’s family to enter 
into a behavioral cont[r]act which may provide for regular school 
attendance among other requirements 
 ● Any special conditions necessary to protect the child from future 
abuse or neglect 
 
(C) Deliver the child to a shelter facility or a licensed attendant care 
center along with the law enforcement officer[’]s written application.  
The . . . facility shall then have custody as if the child had been 
directly delivered to the facility by the law enforcement officer . . . . 
 
(D) Refer the child to the county or district attorney for appropriate 
proceedings to be filed or refer the child and family to the Secretary 
of Social and Rehabilitation Services for investigations in regard to 
the allegations. 
 
(E) Make recommendations to the county or district attorney concerning 
immediate intervention programs, which may be beneficial to the 
juvenile.80 
This Note is primarily concerned with referrals under (D), which unlike 
other options, would likely result in court proceedings.  However, the 
other referral choices elucidate the number of children brought into the 
system that would fall outside the adult criminal justice system.  It is 
apparent that some of the juveniles are merely troubled or confused, not 
necessarily a danger to society.81  Of course, there remains a large 
portion of juveniles who are suspected of felonies or misdemeanors: 
64.1% are suspected of misdemeanors,82 and 19.3% are suspected of 
various felonies.83  Therefore, the juvenile justice system is not easily 
                                                          
 80. Id. at 19–20. 
 81. For instance, in fiscal year 2005, 16.6% of the juveniles arrested were suspected of running 
away, truancy, being victims of abuse or neglect, or other non-felony, non-misdemeanor issues.  See 
KANSAS JUVENILE JUSTICE AUTHORITY, KANSAS JUVENILE INTAKE AND ASSESSMENT STATISTICS: 
ALLEGED JUVENILE OFFENDERS app. D (2006), available at http://www.kansas.gov/jja/documents/ 
Data_juvenileintakeanDassessmt.pdf. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
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pigeonholed; rather, it is quite broad and encompasses a number of 
juveniles suspected of a variety of crimes. 
Even if juveniles are believed to have committed a misdemeanor or 
felony, there are four options available for JAIC workers that do not 
involve filing charges and proceeding with a juvenile adjudication.84  The 
availability of these additional options typifies the still inherent 
difference between the adult criminal system and the juvenile system.  
For instance, options (A) and (B)—release and conditional release of the 
child to a legal guardian—explicitly state such referrals should be 
undertaken only if in the child’s best interest.85  Furthermore, option (C) 
refers to custody of the child and (E) recommends immediate 
intervention if beneficial to the child.86  References to the child’s best 
interest and to custody indicate that the state still tries to play the 
beneficent parental role, particularly when the county or district attorney 
does not plan to file charges.  Though some argue that the essential 
nature of the juvenile justice system has changed,87 one can see—simply 
by looking at the array of options and the ability to fashion individual 
solutions—that assertion focuses too narrowly on the adjudicatory 
aspects of the system. 
2. Adjudication and Sentencing 
If the referral worker chooses option (D), then formal charges are 
filed by the county or district attorney, and a trial is held.88  During the 
trial, juveniles have certain rights, including notice of charges, 
appointment of counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and the reasonable 
doubt standard.89  Specifically, K.S.A. 38-2306 gives juveniles the right 
to an attorney at all proceedings, whether or not the juvenile can afford 
one.90  Additionally, the court may appoint a volunteer court-appointed 
special advocate (CASA), whose purpose is to advocate solely for the 
best interests of the child.91  Another recent change to the system is a 
presumption that the hearings—detention, first appearance, adjudicatory, 
and sentencing—are open to the public unless the judge determines 
otherwise, either because of the interests of the victim or the interests of 
                                                          
 84. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 85. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 86. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 87. See infra Part II.D. 
 88. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 89. See supra notes 60–61; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2306 (Supp. 2008); § 38-2355. 
 90. See § 38-2306. 
 91. Id. § 38-2307. 
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a defendant under sixteen years of age.92  At trial, the question of 
whether a jury would be seated, prior to L.M., was a matter of judicial 
discretion.93  Juveniles could request a jury trial in any felony case; 
however, discretion to grant the request was completely within the 
province of the juvenile court judge.94  Also, the KJJC still operates from 
the rules of civil procedure, seemingly separating juvenile court from 
criminal court.95 
Once the juvenile is adjudged to be a juvenile offender, the court 
moves into the sentencing phase of the proceedings.  There are two 
statutes in Kansas that govern the sentencing of juveniles.  The first is the 
sentencing matrix, K.S.A. 38-2369, which lays out ranges for terms of 
incarceration based upon the offense committed and, in some cases, the 
criminal history of the juvenile offender.96  Because the matrix only 
covers periods of incarceration in juvenile detention facilities and after-
term conditions, such as probation, all of the punishments in the 
sentencing matrix appear punitive in nature.97  In contrast—and in the 
same vein as the progressive reformers of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries—the KJJC provides great flexibility for juvenile 
judges in sentencing through sentencing alternatives, which may be 
invoked through K.S.A. 38-2367.98  The sentencing alternatives include: 
(1) probation; (2) participation in community based programs; (3) 
placement in custody of parents or other legal guardian; (4) counseling, 
mediation, or other drug evaluation; (5) suspension of driver’s license; 
(6) community service; (7) restitution; (8) fines; (9) house arrest; and 
(10) placement in a sanctions house for up to twenty-eight days.99  As for 
the actual distribution of juvenile offenders, the courts do not heavily 
concentrate on a single disposition.  As of January 2009, the average 
distribution of juveniles in the custody of the Kansas Juvenile Justice 
Authority was 26% in the home or with a relative, 21% in a juvenile 
correctional facility, 23% in a youth residential center, and the rest split 
between other facilities—foster homes, psychiatric residential treatment 
facilities, and other locations.100  Given those numbers, it seems apparent 
                                                          
 92. Id. § 38-2353. 
 93. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 165–66 (Kan. 2008). 
 94. § 38-2357. 
 95. Id. § 38-2354. 
 96. Id. § 38-2369. 
 97. See id. 
 98. § 38-2361; § 38-2367 (allowing the judge to modify a sentence). 
 99. § 38-2361. 
 100. KANSAS JUVENILE JUSTICE AUTHORITY, STATEWIDE MONTH END POPULATION: 
PLACEMENTS FOR YOUTH IN THE CUSTODY OF JJA ON THE LAST DAY OF EACH MONTH 1 (2009), 
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that the juvenile justice system in Kansas is not solely focused on taking 
punitive action against juvenile offenders—at least in the form of 
incarceration in juvenile correctional facilities. 
D. In re L.M. 
The Kansas Supreme Court recently overturned Findlay v. State101 
with its decision in In re L.M.102  L.M. appealed the denial of a jury trial 
to the Kansas Supreme Court, which applied McKeiver and decided the 
case under the Kansas Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.103  The majority based the decision on one key rationale—
that after 1984, the dramatic changes to the juvenile justice system made 
juvenile adjudications adversarial in nature and, thus, more equivalent to 
criminal prosecutions.104  In justifying the primary rationale, the majority 
made three arguments.  First, the language used in the KJJC, which the 
Kansas Legislature changed after 1984, asserts a fundamentally 
different—more punitive—goal for the juvenile justice system.105  
Second, the punishment scheme used for juvenile offenders changed 
dramatically, particularly because a sentencing matrix was adopted, and 
the kinds of punishment options available to juveniles and adults became 
strikingly similar.106  The third and final argument was that many of the 
protective measures originally adopted to protect juveniles had been 
stripped away and the parens patriae nature of the system had 
disintegrated.107  Because the revised KJJC refers to its proceedings as 
prosecutions, and as being based on violations of the laws of Kansas, the 
majority in L.M. concluded that juvenile defendants are entitled to jury 
trials under the Kansas Constitution.108  The concurrence agreed with the 
majority in the result, but focused only on the right under the Kansas 
Constitution, not the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.109  The dissent 
attacked each of the reasons asserted by the majority—language, 
punishment, and absence of protective measures.110 
                                                                                                                       
available at http://www.kansas.gov/jja/documents/Data_FY09CourtOrderedCustody.pdf. 
 101. 681 P.2d 20 (Kan. 1984), abrogated by In re L.M., 186 P. 3d 164 (Kan. 2008). 
 102. 186 P.3d at 172. 
 103. Id. at 170–72. 
 104. Id. at 168. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. at 169. 
 107. Id. at 170. 
 108. Id. at 172. 
 109. Id. at 172–73 (Luckert, J., concurring). 
 110. Id. at 175–80 (McFarland, C.J., dissenting). 
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In the end, though, the majority recognized a newly-minted right for 
juveniles in Kansas.  Unfortunately, the court gave minimal guidance on 
how the right should operate in future cases.  Instead, the court stated 
only that “[t]he right to a jury trial in juvenile offender proceedings is a 
new rule of procedure . . . .”111  So, in effect, the Kansas Supreme Court 
put off the question for another time.  However, the Kansas Supreme 
Court took one explicit step and invalidated both K.S.A. 38-2344(d) 
(which made bench trials the default rule) and K.S.A. 38-2357 (which 
gave courts the option to grant jury trials).112 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Kansas Supreme Court decided In re L.M. on the premise that 
the Kansas juvenile justice system fundamentally changed after 1984.113  
To a large degree, that is true.  There have been substantial changes in 
the language of the KJJC, in the approach to sentencing, and in the 
privacy restrictions that originally protected juveniles.114  Those changes, 
however, belie an important truth: the Kansas juvenile justice system 
remains substantially different than the adult criminal system, as it 
retains much of the parens patriae nature upon which it was originally 
constructed.115  That reality, along with policy considerations, including 
decreased efficiency and added cost, must be considered when 
determining how the right to a jury trial should operate.  This Note will 
explore all of these competing concerns in an attempt to provide a cogent 
and effective solution that will preserve constitutional rights in a manner 
that does not destroy the unique nature of the juvenile justice system. 
A. Analysis of In re L.M. and Changes in the Language of the KJJC 
Before examining how a juvenile’s right to a jury trial should 
operate, it is important to determine the precise holding of the Kansas 
Supreme Court in L.M.  As stated above, the majority analyzes changes 
within the KJJC through statutory language.  These statutory changes 
indicate that the Legislature pushed the juvenile justice system into 
serving a punitive function.  Perhaps this is partly because national  
 
                                                          
 111. Id. at 172 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. at 170. 
 113. See id. at 168. 
 114. See infra Part III.A. 
 115. See supra Part II.C. 
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statistics indicate that repeat offenders are not being rehabilitated but 
instead are accounting for a large percentage of juvenile crime.116 
In acknowledging the shift by the Legislature and the changing 
nature of the juvenile system, the majority utilizes two distinct rationales 
in recognizing the right to a jury trial.  First, the majority argued that the 
juvenile justice system changed, losing its parens patriae character and 
becoming more like the adult criminal system, which points toward the 
U.S. constitutional standard.  Second, the majority critiqued the changing 
terminology of juvenile court adjudications, which points toward the 
Kansas constitutional standard.  The question is whether any of the 
Kansas Supreme Court’s reasoning elucidates a preference for one 
standard over the other, or whether a third standard should be adopted. 
1. Analysis Under the U.S. Constitution 
The majority in L.M. turns first to a juvenile’s right to a jury trial 
under the U.S. Constitution and analyzes both the changed nature of the 
juvenile justice system and the decline of the parens patriae doctrine.  
The first statutory revision examined—and arguably the most 
influential—is the stated intent of the KJJC, which reads: “[t]he primary 
goals of the juvenile justice code are to promote public safety, hold 
juvenile offenders accountable for their behavior and improve their 
ability to live more productively and responsibly in the community.”117  
This is in stark contrast to the previously stated intent of the KJOC: 
[E]ach child within [the code’s] provisions shall receive the care, 
custody, guidance, control and discipline, preferably in the child’s own 
home, as will best serve the child’s welfare and the best interests of the 
state.  All proceedings, orders, judgments and decrees shall be deemed 
to have been taken and done in the exercise of the parental power of the 
state.118 
The revision in the language shifts the focus of the code from serving the 
child’s own welfare to promoting public safety and holding juveniles 
accountable.  Additionally, the revision noticeably leaves out the last 
sentence of the previous statute, which refers to the parental power of the 
                                                          
 116. See Korine L. Larsen, Comment, With Liberty and Juvenile Justice for All: Extending the 
Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 835, 846 (1994) (noting that 
juveniles with five or more police contacts account for two-thirds of all offenses). 
 117. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2301 (Supp. 2008). 
 118. Act of May 13, 1982, ch. 182, § 38-1501, 1982 Kan. Sess. Laws 765 (repealed 2006) 
(“enacting the Kansas Code for Care of Children and the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code”). 
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state.  Furthermore, the revision of the KJJC changed other terminology 
in a manner that points toward a more punitive system.  Specifically, 
“dispositional proceedings”119 have become “sentencing proceedings”;120 
a “[s]tate youth center”121 is now a “[j]uvenile correctional institution”;122 
and finally, commitment to a juvenile correctional facility is now a “term 
of incarceration.”123 
Though the L.M. majority made strong arguments that the juvenile 
justice system had fundamentally changed, the basis may only be a 
matter of selective interpretation.  For instance, as the dissent points out, 
the KJOC, in 1982, was aimed at serving the best interests of the state, 
and in contrast, rehabilitation remains a current goal of the KJJC.124  So 
perhaps it depends on which part of each statute the court makes its 
focus.  Furthermore, the dissent draws a stark contrast between the new 
language of the KJJC and the intent of the Kansas Criminal Code, which 
unequivocally indicates the primary goal of the adult criminal system is 
not rehabilitation, but punishment and the protection of society.125 
The majority in L.M. then notes that the punishment options 
available to juvenile court judges are similar to the options available to 
those judges in adult criminal proceedings.  For instance, “[b]oth adults 
and juveniles may be sentenced to probation; a community-based 
program; house arrest; a short-term behavior-modification program like a 
sanctions house or conservation camp; placement in an out-of-home 
facility; or incarceration in a correctional facility.”126  Additionally, 
counseling, drug and alcohol evaluations, mediation, educational 
programs, charitable or community service, restitution, and fines are all 
punishments that are available against both adult and juvenile 
offenders.127  Thus, the majority in L.M. draws the conclusion that 
because the punishment options available in both adult and juvenile 
proceedings are similar, then necessarily the sentencing of juveniles “has 
become much more congruent with the adult model.”128 
However, the majority opinion does not account for how these 
similarities operate in practice.  For instance, the court fails to establish 
                                                          
 119. § 38-1605(b) (repealed 2006), 1982 Kan. Sess. Laws 800. 
 120. § 38-2305(b) (Supp. 2008). 
 121. § 38-1602(g) (repealed 2006), 1982 Kan. Sess. Laws 799. 
 122. § 21-4502(e) (2007). 
 123. § 38-2374 (Supp. 2008). 
 124. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 176 (Kan. 2008) (McFarland, C.J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 176–77. 
 126. Id. at 169. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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that the KJJC’s increased similarity with the adult criminal code actually 
results in more punitive sentences across the board, rather than merely a 
broader array of options at the juvenile court’s disposal.  In that vein, the 
dissent points out that even though sentencing options are similar and 
there is a juvenile sentencing matrix, juvenile sentences on the whole are 
markedly different than those sentences that adults receive for the same 
crimes.129  Additionally, the matrix is explicitly advisory; indeed, 
“[c]ommitment to a juvenile correctional facility for a term under the 
matrix is only one of a number of sentencing alternatives available to a 
juvenile judge.”130  Furthermore, if the judge does hold to the matrix, he 
or she has the power to modify the sentence after its imposition.131  The 
dissent notes other unique options that remain with the juvenile system, 
including the ability to impose a juvenile sentence and stay a concurrent 
adult sentence, “evidenc[ing] a last-ditch effort to extend the favorable 
protections of juvenile court and the benefits of its less severe sentences 
to juvenile offenders.”132  Additionally, the court can help the juvenile 
get more involved with family and community, or deal with the juvenile 
through noncustodial placement, rehabilitation, or intermediate 
intervention programs.133 
The majority and dissent both have logical and interesting arguments 
about how the juvenile justice system has changed and currently 
operates.  The majority essentially concludes its first analysis by arguing 
that because the parens patriae nature of the juvenile justice system has 
eroded, it is now substantially similar to the adult criminal system, which 
is at least a tacit rejection of the McKeiver rationale—that the juvenile 
system focused more on rehabilitation than punishment.134  That 
conclusion led the Kansas Supreme Court to hold that Kansas juveniles 
“have a U.S. constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”135  Therefore, it would appear that one 
threshold acceptable to the Kansas Supreme Court might be the U.S. 
constitutional standard.  However, the court indicates another threshold 
might be equally acceptable. 
                                                          
 129. Id. at 177 (McFarland, C.J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 178. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 178–79. 
 133. Id. at 179–81. 
 134. Id. at 170 (majority opinion). 
 135. Id. 
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2. Analysis Under the Kansas Constitution 
The second basis upon which the Kansas Supreme Court recognized 
a juvenile’s right to a jury trial is the Kansas Constitution.136  The focus 
is on section 10 of the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights, which 
provides the right to a jury trial in “all prosecutions.”137  The verbiage 
“prosecution” is important because the term “juvenile adjudication” in 
the KJJC was changed by the Legislature to prosecutions for violations 
of Kansas criminal laws—or the equivalent of criminal prosecutions.138  
Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court recognizes the right to a jury trial under 
the Kansas Constitution, in addition to the U.S. Constitution, and hints 
that the Kansas constitutional standard may also serve as an acceptable 
rule.139 
The question is, which threshold should control in juvenile 
adjudications?  Unfortunately, the L.M. majority failed to indicate a 
preference and effectively denied the opportunity to fashion a solution.140  
This lack of judicial action has left the question unresolved.  This Note 
will lay out and critique the aforementioned standards and other potential 
thresholds, taking into account the analysis of the court, the operation of 
the juvenile justice system, the interest of juveniles, and other policy 
concerns to determine an appropriate solution. 
B. Policy Concerns Inherent in the Operation of the Right to a Jury 
Trial 
Before critiquing individual standards, it is important to take a big-
picture look at the policy concerns inherent with granting jury trials to 
juveniles.  While there are certainly benefits to jury trials, such as a 
strong argument for increased accuracy of the fact finder141 and 
protection from potential government oppression or judicial bias, there 
are also very real concerns.  In particular, jury trials will tend to decrease 
efficiency, destroy the little privacy that juvenile defendants have 
                                                          
 136. Id. at 171. 
 137. Id.; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 10. 
 138. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 172; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2303(c), (d) (Supp. 2008); 
§ 38-2304(e)(2); § 38-2346(a), (b)(1); § 38-2350. 
 139. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 172. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: 
Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 564–65 
(1998) (noting five cases within a year where a juvenile was convicted by a judge on scant evidence 
and was overturned on appeal for insufficiency of the evidence). 
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retained, and increase costs inherent in building new courtrooms, hiring 
new judges, and paying juries.  Many of these policy concerns stem from 
the likelihood that many juveniles will elect a trial by jury, particularly 
given that juries have generally been thought to acquit criminal 
defendants more often than judges.142 
The first and most glaring policy consideration that must be 
acknowledged is the decreased efficiency that jury trials, particularly a 
substantial number of jury trials, will bring to the juvenile justice system.  
In adjudicating juveniles, there is a concern for a quick resolution beyond 
merely the juvenile’s obvious interest.  In particular, parents have a 
vested interest because their parental rights hang in the balance.143  
Additionally, the state desires a quick resolution to ensure that 
rehabilitation is effective.  Unfortunately, jury trials will take longer.144  
On average, a felony jury trial takes between two and four days,145 with 
the time required to pick a jury accounting for twenty to thirty-five 
percent.146  In contrast, a bench trial takes about one day.147  Furthermore, 
jury trials require more preparation time, which will result in higher costs 
for the prosecution, court-appointed attorneys, and juveniles and their 
families.148  Moreover, courts will be forced to endure added time for 
voir dire and jury deliberations.  These concerns are very real.  Courts in 
Shawnee County received dozens of requests for jury trials in the first 
three months after the L.M. ruling,149 and courts in Sedgwick County 
plan to accommodate up to 100 new juvenile trials a year.150  Such 
volume and potential for decreased efficiency is a strong argument to 
seriously consider the number of trials that would be expected at each 
potential threshold. 
A large number of jury trials will also substantially increase the costs 
of the juvenile court system, including construction costs, judicial 
salaries, juror stipends, and more hours for court-appointed attorneys.  
                                                          
 142. Id. at 562–63. 
 143. See § 38-2334 (highlighting instances when removal of juvenile from parental custody is 
appropriate); § 38-2365 (discussing when certain juvenile offenders may be removed from the home 
and placed in the custody of the state). 
 144. Klepper, supra note 7. 
 145. Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 60 
(1999). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Cristina Janney, Juvenile Trials Could Burden System: Untested Policy Leaves Questions 
for Local Legal Systems, NEWTON KANSAN, Jan. 17, 2009, available at http://www.thekansan.com/ 
news/x2009616986/Juvenile-trials-could-burden-system. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Klepper, supra note 7. 
 150. Sylvester, supra note 7. 
07.0_TREASTER FINAL 4/22/2009  8:05:31 AM 
1294 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
Indeed, juries entail a number of costs that are not associated with bench 
trials, including: 
[T]he expense of preparing and updating juror lists and pattern jury 
instructions, juror fees (up to fifty dollars per day in some jurisdictions, 
but in many states, much less), jury administrators’ salaries, jury 
summoning and qualification mailings, proceedings to enforce jury 
summonses, jury education programs, juror meals, and, for some cases, 
the cost of sequestering the jury during deliberations.151 
In terms of construction, as of September 27, 2008, only one juvenile 
courtroom in Johnson County, Kansas, was equipped to have a jury 
trial.152  Sedgwick County has a similar problem; the juvenile court 
judges have recognized that the new juvenile court facilities do not yet 
have facilities for juries, thus requiring further construction.153  As 
indicated previously, there will be an enormous efficiency concern with 
increased jury trials, and one way to alleviate that concern is to hire more 
juvenile court judges.  However, that solution really just reallocates the 
concern to a tangible financial cost, rather than the opportunity cost of 
inefficient juvenile courts.  Thus, efficiency and cost are the two primary 
policy concerns that drive an argument for a narrow interpretation of 
L.M. and the adoption of a threshold that errs on the side of fewer trials. 
C. Establishing a Standard in Light of In re L.M. and Inherent Policy 
Considerations 
The majority in L.M. tacitly acknowledges that two jury trial 
standards would be favorable, those under the U.S. and Kansas 
Constitutions.  The not-so-obvious standards that may be viable are the 
standard that would be recognized by an extremely narrow interpretation 
of the majority opinion, and the previous standard established by the 
Kansas Legislature for a juvenile jury trial with court permission.  This 
Note will critique how well the majority’s rationale supports adoption of 
each standard, and will consider the impact each standard will have on 
the operation of the juvenile justice system and relevant policy 
considerations mentioned above. 
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1. Jury Trial Standard Under the U.S. Constitution 
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has sketched out 
how the U.S. constitutional right to a jury trial—both under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments—operates in a criminal case.  The seminal 
decision was Duncan v. Louisiana, which held that the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.154  Recognizing the efficiency concerns inherent in granting 
all defendants the right to a jury trial, including those accused of petty 
offenses,155 the majority in Duncan held that a jury trial is a fundamental 
right when the defendant is accused of a serious crime.156  The Duncan 
Court decided that the question of whether a jury trial is a fundamental 
right should be decided at the outset of the litigation, based on the 
potential sentence.157  The Court concluded the analysis by recognizing 
that petty offenses are generally those that carry a prison term of up to 
six months.158  Furthermore, the Court recognized that more than six 
months in jail was the threshold upon which the right to a jury trial 
attached in the eighteenth-century court system.159  The Court declined, 
however, to draw a hard-and-fast line.  Instead, it merely asserted that the 
potential for imprisonment for up to two years alone was enough to make 
the right to a jury trial fundamental.160 
In later cases, however, the Supreme Court refined its approach, 
indicating in Baldwin v. New York that even though many factors are 
considered, “the most relevant . . . criteri[on] . . . [is] the severity of the 
maximum authorized penalty.”161  For the Court, the potential term of 
incarceration indicated a judgment made by the Legislature about the 
seriousness of the crime.162  Recognizing this consideration, the Baldwin 
Court held that the potential for any prison term longer than six months 
entitled the defendant to a jury trial.163  The Court has recognized, 
however, that crimes carrying a potential prison term of less than six 
months may yet be serious offenses for purposes of the right to a jury 
                                                          
 154. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968). 
 155. Id. at 158. 
 156. Id. at 157–58. 
 157. Id. at 159. 
 158. Id. at 161. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 161–62. 
 161. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (plurality opinion). 
 162. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969). 
 163. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69. 
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trial, depending on whether other more-serious penalties attach.164  The 
burden, however, is on the defendant, because the Court “presume[s] for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment that society views such an offense as 
‘petty.’”165 
Given that the jury trial standard under the U.S. Constitution is based 
on the potential for the defendant to spend more than six months in jail, 
the issue then becomes what that standard would mean for juveniles in 
Kansas.  The KJJC sentencing matrix divides offenses into four separate 
categories: (1) violent offenders; (2) serious offenders; (3) chronic 
offenders; and (4) conditional release violators.166  Each of those four 
categories has sub-categories that further break up the division of 
violations and sentences.167  The most relevant consideration is the 
lower-level offenders because they are not clearly subjected to punitive 
punishments.  The two lowest levels are conditional release violators and 
juveniles adjudicated under chronic offender III status; those individuals 
face a possible six-month incarceration in a juvenile correctional 
facility.168  With conditional release violators, it is possible for the judge 
to fashion a punishment alternative to incarceration,169 but that is 
discretionary.  The key is that the juvenile defendant is threatened with 
the possibility of six months in jail—the cut-off for the right to a jury 
trial for adults under the U.S. Constitution. 
Thus, according to the U.S. constitutional standard, every juvenile 
defendant who faces the potential to be adjudicated as a juvenile 
offender, with the exception of chronic offenders III and conditional 
release violators, would benefit from the right to a jury trial.  It is 
apparent, then, that the U.S. constitutional standard is relatively broad, 
which indicates that there may be cost and efficiency concerns with 
adopting this standard.  Additionally, there are other concerns that make 
the adoption of this threshold problematic.  Specifically, the Kansas 
Supreme Court, in ruling that the denial of the right to a jury trial is 
unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, may 
contradict McKeiver.  At the very least, it raises serious questions.  
Granted, there is an argument that the system has changed so 
substantially that McKeiver’s rationale is no longer applicable.  But even 
in light of that argument, it would seem illogical to adopt such a 
                                                          
 164. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161. 
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threshold when it is far from clear whether or not that aspect of the 
opinion is valid.  Thus, it is appropriate to examine whether the Kansas 
constitutional standard offers a better alternative. 
2. Jury Trial Standard Under the Kansas Constitution 
The right to a jury trial under the Kansas Constitution is significantly 
different than the U.S. constitutional standard.  The Kansas Constitution 
grants the right to a jury trial under sections 5 and 10 of the Kansas 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  Section 10 reads: “In all prosecutions, the 
accused shall be allowed . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury . . . .”170  The Kansas Supreme Court expounded on what actually 
qualifies as a prosecution.  Although a jury trial was denied for a 
bastardy proceeding—where the court indicated that “all prosecutions” 
referred only to those prosecutions for violations of Kansas law171—the 
right to a jury trial was recognized in a nuisance proceeding.172  The 
court, in In re Rolfs, declared that “no party can be subjected to a 
prosecution for an act of a criminal nature . . . without in some way and 
before some tribunal being secured an opportunity of having the truth of 
that charge inquired into by an impartial jury.”173 
The Kansas Legislature has responded to these legal standards by 
outlining the general parameters of when and how the right to a jury trial 
may be invoked.  Because the right attaches in any criminal prosecution, 
it applies to both felonies and misdemeanors.174  However, the right 
operates differently in each circumstance.  When accused of a felony, a 
defendant is entitled to a jury of twelve members, unless of course, the 
parties agree to a waiver.175  In contrast, misdemeanors are presumptively 
tried to the court, unless the defendant requests a jury trial in writing 
seven days from the first notice of trial, and juries are only composed of 
six people.176  Thus, unlike under the U.S. Constitution, under Kansas 
law, defendants still get the right to a jury trial for petty offenses.177  
However, there are some exceptions: trials in municipal court, and trials 
for tobacco or traffic infractions are to the court.178 
                                                          
 170. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 10. 
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Given this standard, the analysis turns to whether the right under the 
Kansas Constitution is a feasible threshold, particularly given that it is 
much broader than the federal right.  The Kansas right would mean 
certain misdemeanors and low-grade felonies, which are not covered in 
the sentencing matrix, would require jury trials.179  The matrix only 
applies to misdemeanors when committed by repeat offenders qualifying 
for chronic offender III status.180  However, juveniles are frequently 
adjudicated as juvenile offenders for misdemeanor crimes; there were 
9329 in 2005.181  At the very least, all of those juveniles, along with the 
additional 2802 juveniles arrested for felonies in 2005, would be entitled 
to a jury trial.182  These numbers say nothing of the additional 
juveniles—some 2418 in 2005—suspected of running away, truancy, or 
being victims of abuse or neglect—situations that are not covered in the 
adult criminal justice system.183  Under a strict interpretation of Kansas 
Supreme Court precedent, this latter category, particularly those 
juveniles suspected of running away and being truant, should be 
guaranteed the right to a jury trial; however, such a result is illogical.184  
Those offenses are only illegal for juveniles, so it is likely that the 
Kansas Legislature never considered the possibility that juveniles would 
receive jury trials for those cases.  Therefore, for the sake of finding an 
agreeable compromise, this Note will equate those offenses with tobacco 
and traffic infractions and not consider their inclusion in the operation of 
a juvenile’s right to a jury trial. 
Even with that compromise, juveniles would be granted a very broad 
right with the potential for 10,000 additional jury trials in Kansas Courts.  
Even if 90% are plea bargained, as is the approximate national 
average,185 that leaves 1000 potential jury trials.  Such a realization 
brings the policy concerns mentioned earlier into acute focus, and it 
reinforces the fact that a narrow interpretation of L.M. is necessary, if for 
no other reason than to refrain from draining state resources and clogging 
the juvenile justice system.  Thus, it is quite frankly unworkable and 
impracticable, to say nothing of the further deterioration it would cause 
to the intimate nature of the juvenile justice system, to adopt the standard  
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under the Kansas Constitution.  There are, however, other options 
available. 
In recognition of the fact that the Kansas Supreme Court was not 
explicit about what counts as a criminal prosecution, it is plausible that 
L.M. could be interpreted very narrowly.  Such an interpretation would 
necessitate looking solely at the function of the opinion for the specific 
case considered by the Kansas Supreme Court.  This function effectively 
rules that a juvenile offender who is adjudicated as a serious offender I, 
carrying the potential for a thirty-six-month term of incarceration,186 and 
who has to register as a sex offender, deserves the right to a jury trial.187  
Whether that is the standard or not, at the very least, that threshold is the 
starting point for establishing when the right to a jury trial operates. 
3. Other Potential Standards 
The question, though, is whether that should be the sole standard.  
This Note argues that it should not.  First of all, it is a narrow 
interpretation drawn from a broad opinion.  After all, the Kansas 
Supreme Court is asserting that jury trials are required for all KJJC 
adjudications that can be considered criminal prosecutions and subject 
juveniles to punitive sentences, similar to what an adult would face.188  
With this holding, it would seem that the court intended for the opinion 
to cover a wide swath of juvenile adjudications and potential punitive 
sentences.  A very narrow interpretation would leave off the following 
categories under the Kansas Juvenile Sentencing Matrix: (1) serious 
offender II—subject to nine-to-eighteen-month terms of incarceration; 
(2) chronic offender I and II—subject to six-to-eighteen-month terms of 
incarceration; and (3) chronic offender III and conditional release 
violators—subject to three-to-six-month terms of incarceration.189  Thus, 
a juvenile could commit a felony and be sentenced to a year and a half in 
a juvenile correctional facility without a jury trial.  Surely such a 
punishment would be termed punitive by the court and such an 
adjudication would be considered a prosecution. 
The last logical threshold, then, is the statutory language set by the 
Kansas Legislature prior to the In re L.M. decision, which the Kansas  
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Supreme Court ruled as unconstitutional because the language was 
permissive.190  The statute reads: 
In all cases involving offenses committed by a juvenile which, if done 
by an adult, would make the person liable to be arrested and prosecuted 
for the commission of a felony, the judge may upon motion, order that 
the juvenile be afforded a trial by jury.  Upon the juvenile being 
adjudged to be a juvenile offender, the court shall proceed with 
sentencing.191 
Thus, it is plausible to conclude that the appropriate action to take 
following L.M. is to merely change the language of the statute from 
“may” to “shall,” and establish the threshold at the adjudication of a 
felony.  This would provide a clear and easy-to-administer rule.  The 
problem, though, lies in the recognition that there are felonies where 
incarceration is not a potential punishment upon the first offense, 
particularly severity level III and IV felony drug adjudications.192  
Additionally, there are times when defendants accused of misdemeanors 
face the potential for six months of incarceration—although the 
defendants must have prior adjudications.193  Therefore, such a threshold 
is an illogical solution.  A focus on verbiage (i.e., felony versus 
misdemeanor) ignores the obvious fact that via the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s opinion, as well as common sense, it is clear that potential 
punishment, whether punitive or rehabilitative, should be the focus.  
Therefore, though changing the language in the statute—and thus 
requiring jury trials in all felony cases—is one plausible solution, it is 
less than ideal. 
4. Identifying the Ideal Standard for Juvenile Jury Trials in Kansas 
The question then becomes, if each of the four previously examined 
thresholds are flawed, then what standard should be adopted?  Logic 
dictates several requirements: (1) it must be clear and easy to apply so 
juvenile courts are not trying to interpret a convoluted standard; (2) it 
must be consistent with the reasoning of the L.M. court, so it must protect 
juveniles who are clearly subject to criminal prosecutions and punitive 
punishments; (3) any standard should protect the ability of juvenile 
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courts to operate in a more intimate setting when the function of the 
adjudication is rehabilitation and not punishment; and (4) the right 
should not be overly broad to ensure cost and efficiency do not become 
overriding concerns.  These considerations lead to one clear reading of 
the L.M. opinion: the right to a jury trial should be guaranteed to 
juveniles that are subject to potential terms of incarceration of more than 
six months (i.e., the U.S. constitutional standard). 
A threshold of more than six months in jail would be easy to 
interpret, and in that way, helpful to lower courts.  Such a rule would 
include violent offenders I and II, serious offenders I and II, and chronic 
offenders I and II.194  Juveniles charged with offenses not in the six 
categories mentioned above would not have the right to a jury trial.  
Some may argue that a six month minimum is an arbitrary division.  
However, because the United States Supreme Court established that 
same arbitrary division to govern an adult’s right to a jury trial, that 
argument is unpersuasive. 
Additionally, such a threshold invokes the right to a jury trial only 
when there is the potential for a punitive sentence.  A strong argument 
can be made that L.M. guarantees a right to a jury trial when the goal is 
punishment and not rehabilitation.  Some might argue the rehabilitative 
nature of the system is continually overcome by a focus on punishing 
juveniles in all adjudications, but that argument focuses narrowly on 
verbiage and misses how the juvenile justice system operates in practice.  
In reality, juveniles subject to sentences of six months, or other less 
onerous dispositions, can be said to benefit from the parens patriae 
nature of the juvenile justice system, and that opportunity should be 
preserved.  Furthermore, there is a clear inference—made from the 
relatively short sentences—that those juveniles can more easily be 
rehabilitated.  Furthermore, as mentioned previously, it is generally 
accepted that crimes with the potential for a maximum six-month 
sentence are presumed petty in nature.  Adopting this threshold, the right 
would trigger when a juvenile is subject to between six and eighteen-
month terms of incarceration, which is clearly punitive. 
The third reason to adopt the U.S. constitutional standard is to 
preserve the intimate nature of the juvenile justice system, where 
rehabilitation is still the goal.  As mentioned previously, the juvenile 
justice system retains much of the intimate nature that it was constructed 
upon.  While the L.M. opinion could be read to support the adoption of a 
broad standard, like the Kansas constitutional standard, such a reading 
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would grant too broad of a right to a jury trial and destroy intimate 
adjudications in one sweeping brushstroke.  Such a result would ignore 
the nuance of L.M.—that while the court is clear that juveniles subject to 
punitive sentences must be protected by juries, the court is silent on those 
juveniles that benefit from the remnants of the parens patriae doctrine. 
For that reason, this Note argues that the Kansas Supreme Court 
meant the new right to operate during situations where the goal of the 
juvenile system is clearly punitive, but not operate during other situations 
where the goal of the system remains rehabilitation and protecting the 
best interests of the child.  Such an analysis of the L.M. opinion indicates 
that the in-excess-of-six-months requirement is rooted in an abundance 
of logic.  Such a standard will essentially bifurcate the juvenile justice 
system, ensuring certain juveniles—those threatened with harsh punitive 
sentences—will be free to exercise their right to a jury trial, while those 
accused of smaller crimes and subject to lighter sentences are still 
guaranteed the intimate adjudication that has been the hallmark of the 
juvenile justice system.  Such a result would strike a careful balance 
rooted in the rationale of the L.M. majority, while nodding to the 
dissent’s concerns and negotiating the tenuous relationship between In re 
L.M. and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. 
The final two considerations are cost and efficiency, which must 
both be weighed to ensure the number of jury trials does not overwhelm 
the juvenile justice system.  Setting the threshold at chronic offenders I 
and II, which have the potential for six-to-eighteen-month sentences, will 
ensure there is not an overwhelming number of jury trials; all of the 
misdemeanors would be weeded out, and many of the lower-level 
felonies would not qualify, which would leave only chronic offenders 
accused of lower-level felonies and those offenders accused of more 
serious felonies.  Assuming that a large portion—90% or so—of the 
offenders plea bargain, the number of jury trials statewide would be 
around 200–300.195  While costs will increase and efficiency in 
adjudications will decrease, it will not be to the extent that it cripples the 
juvenile justice system.  Thus, the in-excess-of-six-month requirement is 
a logical standard from a policy standpoint.  Therefore, given that the 
federal standard is clear-cut, focuses on punitive sentences, protects the 
juvenile justice system, and is not burdensome from a cost and efficiency 
standard, this Note urges its adoption. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Kansas juvenile courts need guidance on how to apply the L.M. 
decision.  The counties are in the process of estimating how many jury 
trials they need to accommodate, and juveniles, their attorneys, and their 
families are desperate to understand how the right will apply.  For these 
reasons, either the Kansas Supreme Court or the Kansas Legislature 
needs to act.  However, when they do, they must ensure that the century 
of effort spent building the separate juvenile court, including the 
recently-made changes and the important nuance of balancing 
punishment with rehabilitation and protection, is not wasted.  This is 
possible because there are many ways to read In re L.M.  It can be read 
as the capstone in the demise of the Kansas Juvenile Justice System, or 
as another step on the path toward that end.  Or, in the alternative, it can 
be read simply as a recognition that even with a separate juvenile justice 
system, different goals and policy considerations and all, there remains a 
certain fundamental nature to the exercise of the right to a jury trial, built 
on eight centuries of English common law and two and a half centuries 
of American legal tradition.  This Note argues for the latter interpretation 
of the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision and urges a resolution—namely 
the federal constitutional right—that does not destroy the juvenile justice 
system in the process of granting juveniles their newly-minted 
constitutional right. 
 
